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Bailing out the FEG:  
Is the Fair Entitlements Guarantee (formerly GEERS)  
approaching its own fiscal cliff? 
 
Mark Wellard 
Amid the recent transition from the Commonwealth’s General Employee Entitlements and 
Redundancy Scheme (“GEERS”) to the new Fair Entitlements Guarantee (“FEG”),1 an issue 
which might have attracted more attention is the budgetary sustainability of the scheme itself.  
A review of Commonwealth Budget Papers and DEEWR Annual Reports for the last few 
years might give the reader cause to query whether GEERS in fact stands for “guaranteed 
endless expense and recovery shortfall”.    
With some adjustments,2 FEG essentially mirrors GEERS but (most importantly) puts the 
scheme on a firmer constitutional footing. 3   Whereas GEERS was administered by the 
Executive branch of government through administrative, “Operational Arrangements”, FEG 
now establishes a truly legislative scheme.4  However, while the legal foundations of the 
scheme have recently been bolstered, so have the costs to the Australian taxpayer.  My 
attention was captured by both an academic article and a mainstream media report last year 
which stated that in the ten years since the introduction of GEERS the Commonwealth has 
expended around a billion dollars of consolidated revenue in paying claims, while only 
recovering a fraction of that amount.5  What do the most recent statistics and public reports 
reveal about the funding of GEERS and its bottom line?  Is there a GEERS “blowout”?  If the 
Commonwealth’s subrogated right of recovery in liquidations (under s 560) is not cutting the 
mustard, what might be done to put FEG on a firmer fiscal footing?        
The bottom line: The Commonwealth’s outlays and recoveries in administering GEERS 
(2002/03 - 2011/12)   
The reported amounts of GEERS appropriations and Commonwealth recoveries for the past 
decade confirm a very low rate of return to the Commonwealth, not to mention a marked 
increase in GEERS payments in just the last three years.  
The “financial pressure” on GEERS has been highlighted in previous commentary.  Bhadily 
(2011) noted that “the increase in numbers of claimants has caused a greater financial 
pressure on GEERS to provide protection for employees who have lost jobs and entitlements 
due to the global financial crisis, thereby prompting the Federal Government in 2009 to 
double the budgetary allocation for GEERS to cope with claimants”.6 For the period 2002/03 
to 2008/09 some $474 million was paid to 62,521 recipients while Commonwealth recoveries 
totalled $83 million for the same period.    For the three most recently-reported financial years 
(2009/10, 2010/11 and 2011/12) GEERS payments totalled some $501 million, of which only 
$57 million has been recovered.7   
The trend in GEERS funding over the last decade is set out in tabular form below:8  
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Financial Year GEERS 
payments 
No. 
Recipients
No. 
Insolvencies 
Recoveries 
 
2002/03 to 
2007/08 
(6 years) 
 
 
$374.62 m 
(on average around 
$62 m/yr) 
 
 
 
51,494 
 
 
5,796 
 
 
$74.08 m 
2008/09 $99.75 m 11,027 1,350 $8.79 m 
2009/10 $154.05 m 15,565 1,617 $18.81 m 
2010/11 $151.49 m 15,412 N/A $16.86 m 
2011/12 $195.53 m 13,929 N/A $21.58 m 
Total (10 years) $975.44 million   $140.8 million 
 
Whether due to the global financial crisis, the rising number of liquidations9 or other factors, 
it appears that the years 2008/09 and 2009/10 were something of a turning point.  Of the $975 
million in GEERS payments made during the last decade, around $500 million was paid in 
just the last three years.  Over the last decade the Commonwealth’s subrogated recoveries 
have yielded a dividend of around $141 million or 14.4c in the dollar – not a particularly 
handsome return for a substitute priority creditor.  To reinforce the trend, it can be observed 
that the rate of the Commonwealth’s return for the six years 2002/03 to 2007/08 was around 
20 cents in the dollar, while for the last four reported years the Commonwealth has only 
enjoyed a return of around 11 cents in the dollar.    
2012/13 Additional Estimates – confirmation of a blowout in the scheme? 
The Commonwealth initially budgeted for $202.97 million in GEERS payments in the 
current financial year (2012/13).10  However, the 2012/13 Portfolio Additional Estimates 
Statements for the Department of Education, Employment and Workplace Relations 
(“DEEWR”) released in February 2013 now disclose the following anticipated expenses for 
this financial year:11  
 GEERS: $248.39 million;  
 FEG:  $55.63 million (making a new appearance as a “special appropriation” because 
of the FEG’s operational commencement in December 2012). 
Thus, the revised aggregate estimate of employee assistance payments through the combined 
administration of GEERS and FEG in 2012/13 is $304 million, a projected $109 million 
increase on total GEERS advances in 2011/12 ($195.53 million).  It is not clear to what 
extent this increase might be attributable to the changes made to GEERS in January 2011 
which removed the 16 week cap on eligible redundancy entitlements in favour of a maximum 
four weeks’ redundancy pay per year of service (for as many years of service as an 
employment contract might provide in the way of a redundancy entitlement).12        
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The Commonwealth’s revised forward estimates - largely applicable to the FEG but with 
some minor GEERS run-off - are now $205 million for 2013/14 and $210 million for 
2014/15.  Some might say these are modest (or heroic) projections given the recent 
experience of significant increases in actual and estimated payments during the last four 
years).13          
The FEG moral hazard – are some directors of insolvent companies trading on the 
Commonwealth’s dime? 
In the 2012 mainstream media report referred to above, a spokesman for the Workplace 
Relations Minister was quoted as stating that “these situations [of unpaid entitlements] are 
often a result of financial mismanagement by company directors”.14  This may be putting it 
kindly.  A deficit of recoveries against GEERS/FEG payments is to be expected to some 
degree - this is after all one of the very reasons the scheme was introduced (along with the 
desire to facilitate the timeliness of payments to employees who would otherwise have to 
wait for the conclusion of protracted liquidations).  However, the paltry level of subrogated 
priority distributions evident in the above table begs the question whether directors are taking 
advantage of the scheme by trading on the businesses of hopelessly-insolvent companies, safe 
in the knowledge that the government will be good for the employee entitlements.  It must be 
emphasised that the returns observed in the above table reflect a host of liquidations where 
there were not even enough assets to cover the priority payments enumerated in s 556(1) of 
the Act, let alone any dividend to ordinary unsecured creditors. 
At first blush, one might think that if a director of a hopelessly-insolvent company has 
egregiously caused the company to continue to accrue debts to employees - which remain 
unpaid when the music stops – then surely that director will be answerable to a liquidator for 
insolvent trading.  However, a closer analysis of the insolvent trading laws suggests that this 
is anything but a given.  For one thing, directors would be likely to assert that their duty to 
prevent the insolvent company from “incurring” debts would not be contravened by their 
company becoming further liable for entitlements which were payable under contracts 
entered into well before the company was in financial distress.15   
Further, our insolvent trading laws are framed in such a way that a liquidator can only sue a 
director for compensation in respect of a loss suffered by a creditor whose debt was incurred 
in breach of the s 588G duty.  As will be explained further below, once the employees are 
paid out by a FEG advance they will have sustained no loss in respect of which a liquidator 
can claim compensation under s 588M for “loss resulting from insolvent trading”.  Further, 
the Commonwealth’s “right of subrogation” under s 560 only improves its position in respect 
of its own debt – ie, a FEG advance.  Though a FEG advance may ultimately be 
irrecoverable, it cannot constitute a debt incurred in breach of s 588G (nor a loss suffered as a 
result of such breach) and so likewise cannot be actionable.  If the accrual of employee 
entitlements was to constitute a breach of s 588G, the ability of a liquidator to sue for that 
contravention would appear to fall between two stools.     
What might be done to improve FEG recoveries or address the moral hazard?  
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This lacuna in the insolvent trading provisions could be addressed by the following suite of 
amendments: 
(a) Amend s 588G(1A) to expressly provide that accruing employee entitlements are 
deemed to be “debts incurred” for the purposes of the insolvent trading laws 
This writer has previously pointed out the inadequacies in the current insolvent trading 
provisions insofar as they purport (rather ineffectively) to extend the statutory duty’s reach to 
certain transactions.16  Section 588G(1A) lists a series of deemed “debts incurred” which 
appear to serve little effective purpose in the absence of a deemed creditor for each of those 
deemed “debts”.  A more practical and useful addition to the list of deemed “debts incurred” 
in s 588G(1A) would be the accrual of employee entitlements during a period when the duty 
to prevent insolvent trading is activated (ie, when the company is or will become insolvent 
and the director has reasonable grounds to suspect so).  There would then be no doubt that the 
continuation of employment contracts by a hopelessly-insolvent company (being part and 
parcel of a director’s decision to continue trading) would be regarded as the “incurring” of 
debts for the purposes of s 588G.         
(b) Amend s 560 or s 588M to extend the Commonwealth’s rights of “subrogation” 
to support a liquidator’s action for insolvent trading  
Upon making an advance under the FEG the Commonwealth does not appear to step into the 
shoes of the recipient employees for all intents and purposes.  On its face, section 560 
appears to grant to the Commonwealth a fairly broad right of subrogation in respect of FEG 
advances.  However, beyond ensuring that a priority dividend under s 556 will go to the 
Commonwealth in lieu of the FEG recipients, the provision does not provide for an entire 
substitution such that all of the same rights and positions of the employees attach to the 
Commonwealth.  Section 560(c) provides that  
the person by whom the money was advanced has the same rights under this Chapter as a creditor 
of the company. (emphasis added) 
The Commonwealth will have the same rights under Chapter 5 as “a” creditor – eg, the right 
to apply to court in relation to the exercise or proposed exercise of a court-appointed 
liquidator’s powers (section 472(6)), standing to apply to the court to determine a question 
arising in the winding up (s 511), the right to receive reports prior to a meeting to approve a 
liquidator’s remuneration (ss 473 and 499), the right to apply to court to review the amount of 
remuneration of a liquidator (s 504) and of course the right to vote at meetings of creditors (ss 
473, 477, 479 and 497).   
Section 560 does not provide that the Commonwealth will assume the entire position of “the” 
employee creditors in relation to their debts which have been paid out by the FEG advances.  
This reading of s 560 is supported by the very existence of Reg 5.6.23A which clarifies the 
voting rights and status of a person who has made a s 560 advance.  If s 560 granted a true or 
extensive right of subrogation (such as that enjoyed by insurers) Reg 5.6.23A would not be 
necessary. 
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It should be acknowledged that the Corporations Amendment (Insolvency) Act 2007 (Cth) 
was intended to address these sorts of issues relating to the rights of subrogated creditors 
under s 560.  The Explanatory Memorandum to the Corporations Amendment (Insolvency) 
Bill 2007 stated that one issue with s 560 as it then stood was that 
whilst the subrogated creditor enjoys the same priority as the creditor to whom it has advanced funds, 
they may not have the standing of that creditor, or enjoy the same rights (subrogated creditors enjoy 
rights as an ‘interested person’ in some cases). The rights of subrogated creditors should be consistent 
across the different forms of external administration. Subrogated creditors should retain the rights of 
the original creditors.17 
However, while the Explanatory Memorandum expressed the general intention that under s 
560 a subrogated creditor is “treated as a substitute for the original creditor, retaining all their 
rights”, it is far from clear that the text of the provision can be read or construed so broadly.   
Therefore, it appears that the Commonwealth cannot be a creditor who can be said to have 
“sustained loss” by reason of a director’s insolvent trading.  A liquidator’s compensation 
claim for loss resulting from insolvent trading is brought under s 588M of the Act.  Failing to 
prevent the company from continuing to “incur” debts to employees may well satisfy s 
588M(1)(a) of the Act (ie, which requires the element of a contravention of s 588G(2) or (3)).  
However, in order to sustain a liquidator’s action for insolvent trading, s 588M(1)(b) of the 
Act also requires an identifiable creditor who has sustained loss in respect of the relevant 
debt which was incurred in breach of the s 588G duty.  Once the FEG advances are paid to 
employees there will be no “person to whom the debt is owed” who “has suffered loss or 
damage in relation to the debt because of the company’s insolvency”.18  Accordingly, in such 
circumstances s 588M(1)(b) would prevent a liquidator’s insolvent trading claim ever getting 
off the ground (at least in respect of the employee entitlements which were accrued or 
incurred when the company was insolvent).  
As discussed, s 560 merely affords the Commonwealth’s debt (ie, for its post-liquidation FEG 
advance) the same priority as that granted to the employees’ debts which are paid out by an 
advance. The Commonwealth’s FEG advance cannot be a debt which a director could have 
failed to prevent a company from incurring.  A FEG advance can never be a “debt incurred” 
which could ground a liquidator’s action for compensation for insolvent trading under s 
588M of the Act.   
To address these issues, s 588M could be amended to expressly provide that any provider of 
an advance within the terms of s 560 (eg, the Commonwealth administering the FEG) is 
deemed to be “the creditor” who “suffers loss or damage” for the purposes of s 588M(1)(b), 
to the extent that:  
 the advance resulted in payment of a debt which has been the subject of a s 588G 
contravention; and  
 the subrogated priority under ss 556 and 560 does not yield a recovery of the advance 
made.   
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Alternatively, the terms of s 560 could be amended to grant the Commonwealth a broader or 
true right of subrogation and/or substitution, akin to that of an insurer.  
But aren’t our insolvent trading laws already too strict?  
These proposed amendments no doubt swim against the tide of a substantial body of opinion 
that our insolvent trading laws are already too harsh and need to be relaxed rather than 
tightened (though currently the Government is holding back that particular tide).19  On this 
point, I would reiterate that the target of these legislative improvements would not be the 
“honest director” doing his or her level-best in the insolvency “twilight zone”. The low 
returns to s 556 priority creditors in the liquidations profiled in the above table must surely 
reflect companies which were terminally distressed weeks before the coup de grace was 
finally administered.   
However, to assuage the concerns of those who would still consider such amendments to be 
an unfair or undesirable impost upon directors, the suggested changes could be limited or 
“capped” in some manner – eg, to only extend to, say, the last month of accrued entitlements 
incurred in breach of s 588G.  If liquidation of a company were to produce a return of only 14 
cents in the dollar to s 556 priority creditors (noting that ordinary unsecured creditors would 
receive no dividend at all), a logical conclusion would be that four weeks prior to the 
commencement of the liquidation the directors were (most likely) wilfully trading on with the 
financial support and insurance of Mr and Mrs A Taxpayer.  Alternatively, the suggested 
amendments could be made subject to dividend thresholds, so that directors are only 
answerable for the more excessive or egregious shortfalls to priority creditors.           
Enforcement: time to revisit the Active Creditor Pilot?  
As the readers of this bulletin well know, strengthening the law is one thing and funding its 
enforcement is quite another.  Given the recent budgetary performance of GEERS it is 
something of a mystery why the Commonwealth has not dusted off its very own “General 
Employee Entitlements and Redundancy Scheme Active Creditor Pilot” which was 
undertaken between late 2006 and 2009.  Under the auspices of the Active Creditor Pilot, the 
Commonwealth made available funding to insolvency practitioners to enable them to pursue 
litigation which would (by virtue of section 560) stand to increase Commonwealth recoveries 
of GEERS advances.20    
In these revenue-challenged times, the October 2008 Review of the Active Creditor Pilot now 
appears to wear something of a fiscal halo (at least on the face of the report).  The Review 
reported that “the Pilot has been effective in generating significant returns to the 
Commonwealth and to other creditors, such as employees, that would not have been 
otherwise available through normal GEERS recovery processes”.21 The Review also reported 
that: 
through its operation, the Pilot has acted as an important deterrent against corporate misconduct. The 
provision of Pilot funding to allow insolvency practitioners to investigate prospective claims will lead 
to increased scrutiny of corporate behaviour, with particular emphasis on corporate misconduct in the 
context of outstanding employee entitlements. The Pilot assists to ensure that GEERS does not have the 
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unintended effect of diminishing employer responsibility for employee entitlements, as the pursuit of 
claims creates a greater ‘compliance incentive’ for employers to make arrangements to pay employee 
entitlements to avoid the prospect of litigation.22 
The Review reported that “as at 31 August 2008, $733,546 had been returned to the 
Commonwealth and an additional $2,540,592 was anticipated to be returned to the 
Commonwealth as a result of the action taken in Pilot matters.”23 In respect of “savings 
measures” the Review reported a total anticipated return to the Commonwealth of $3,276,540 
from action taken under the Pilot against an outlay of $644,510.24  The Review concluded 
that “[t]he success of the Pilot is manifest in the fact that it is anticipated the Pilot will return 
562 percent of the funding provided by the Department for the ten completed matters.”25        
The Review concluded with the recommendation that the Active Creditor Pilot be adopted on 
a permanent basis, as it would “increase the rate of recovery for GEERS advances, reduce the 
overall net cost of GEERS to the Commonwealth, improve returns to employees and other 
creditors, improve the Department’s bargaining power in terms of insolvency practitioner 
fees and reinforce the deterrent against corporate misconduct”26  However, it appears that the 
Active Creditor Pilot subsequently disappeared without a trace. In this current, low interest 
rate environment of “chasing yield”, the results of the Active Creditor Pilot (562% return no 
less!) suggest that this is a potential investment which the Commonwealth might do well to 
reconsider in addressing FEG shortfalls. 
Conclusion 
The suggestion that our current insolvent trading laws should be strengthened to support FEG 
recoveries is unlikely to “poll well” in this election year.  However, stakeholders have good 
reason to turn their minds to the evident fiscal deterioration of the FEG (formerly GEERS) 
and to engage in a constructive debate as to whether the scheme can remain sustainable and 
viable.  This article has focussed on how the “recoveries” side of the FEG ledger might be 
improved.  Failing that, current budgetary trends suggest that it may not be long before we 
are revisiting the debate as to how the FEG should be funded  - including whether a 
compulsory insurance (or employer levy) scheme is preferable to one administered out of 
consolidated revenue.          
Few would argue with the desirability and imperative of guaranteeing the recovery of 
employee entitlements in liquidations.  However, in this day and age of “fiscal cliffs”, “debt 
ceilings” and partisan debates over budget deficits and debt-to-GDP ratios, the best thing for 
the ultimate beneficiaries of the FEG is that it continues to be fiscally sustainable.  If Chapter 
5 of the Corporations Act could be amended to assist recoveries and improve the FEG’s 
bottom line then surely this bears serious reflection and consideration by policy-makers.     
     
                                                            
 Lecturer, School of Law, Queensland University of Technology, Brisbane. (mark.wellard@qut.edu.au) 
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